مشخصات درس :
نام درس :
اقتصاد سیاسی
(Political Economics)
نوع درس:
درس پروژه دار
کد درس :
44771
تعداد واحد :
3
مقطع :
کارشناسی ارشد
پیشنیاز:
اقتصادکلان 1 یا اقتصادخرد1
همنیاز :
-
نام درس :
(Political Economics)
نوع درس:
درس پروژه دار
کد درس :
44771
تعداد واحد :
3
مقطع :
کارشناسی ارشد
پیشنیاز:
اقتصادکلان 1 یا اقتصادخرد1
همنیاز :
-
در این درس مباحث اصلی در انتخاب عمومی و اقتصاد سیاسی و سرفصل‌های اصلی مرتبط با اقتصاد سیاسی کشورهای صادرکننده نفت بررسی می‌شود. در ابتدای درس دانشجویان با مفاهیم پایه اقتصاد سیاسی و انتخاب عمومی آشنا شده و پس از آن، موضوع تصمیم‌گیری جمعی و ضرورت‌های برگزاری انتخابات و شکل‌گیری دموکراسی را فرا می‌گیرند. در ادامه، مدل‌ها نظری مختلف رای‌گیری، رفتار نامزدهای انتخابات و نحوه‌ی تصمیم‌گیری رای‌دهندگان معرفی می‌شوند. سپس، با اثر نظام‌های سیاسی متفاوت بر عملکرد اقتصاد، نقش گروه‌های ذینفع و لابی‌گری و در نهایت نقش بروکراسی آشنا می‌شوند. در انتهای درس، برخی از مقالات کلیدی در حوزه اقتصادی سیاسی نفت و اقتصاد سیاسی تحریم را آموزش داده خواهد شد.
اهداف
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سرفصل‌ها
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مراجع اصلی
| 1— Public choice vs. political economy Reference(s): Besley (2007), The New Political Economy. Blankart & Koester (2005), Political Economics versus Public Choice. Alesina, Persson & Tabellini (2006), Reply to Blankart and Koester’s Political Economics versus Public Choice. 2— The role of institutions Reference(s): Acemoglu et al. (2005), Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth. Acemoglu et al. (2001), An African Success Story: Botswana. 3— State capacity Reference(s): Besley and Persson, Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. 4— The resource curse hypothesis Reference(s): Mehlum et al. (2000), Institutions and the Resource Curse. Robinson et al. (2006), Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. 5— Oil and democracy Reference(s): Ross (2001), Does Oil Hinder Democracy? Ross (2008), Does Oil Really Hinder Democracy? Ross (2012), The Oil Curse. 6— Political regimes and economic performance Reference(s): Acemoglu (2009), Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. 7— Dictatorship Reference(s): Wintrobe (2002), Dictatorship. Wintrobe (1998), the Political Economy of Dictatorship. 8— Dictatorship vs. democracy Reference(s): Acemoglu, and Robinson (2001), A Theory of Political Transitions. 9— political economy of sanction Reference(s): Hufbauer et al. (2007), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007), The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions. 10— Macroeconomics of resource dependence Reference(s): Barma et al. (2012), Rents to Riches; The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development. Eifert et al. (2003), The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil-Producing Countries. Arezki et al. (2011), Beyond the Curse: Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources. |
مراجع کمکی
در این درس مباحث اصلی در انتخاب عمومی و اقتصاد سیاسی و سرفصل‌های اصلی مرتبط با اقتصاد سیاسی کشورهای صادرکننده نفت بررسی می‌شود. در ابتدای درس دانشجویان با مفاهیم پایه اقتصاد سیاسی و انتخاب عمومی آشنا شده و پس از آن، موضوع تصمیم‌گیری جمعی و ضرورت‌های برگزاری انتخابات و شکل‌گیری دموکراسی را فرا می‌گیرند. در ادامه، مدل‌ها نظری مختلف رای‌گیری، رفتار نامزدهای انتخابات و نحوه‌ی تصمیم‌گیری رای‌دهندگان معرفی می‌شوند. سپس، با اثر نظام‌های سیاسی متفاوت بر عملکرد اقتصاد، نقش گروه‌های ذینفع و لابی‌گری و در نهایت نقش بروکراسی آشنا می‌شوند. در انتهای درس، برخی از مقالات کلیدی در حوزه اقتصادی سیاسی نفت و اقتصاد سیاسی تحریم را آموزش داده خواهد شد.
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مفاهیم پایه در اقتصاد سیاسی و نظریة انتخاب عمومی
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1— Public choice vs. political economy
Reference(s):
Besley (2007), The New Political Economy.
Blankart & Koester (2005), Political Economics versus Public Choice.
Alesina, Persson & Tabellini (2006), Reply to Blankart and Koester’s Political Economics versus Public Choice.
2— The role of institutions
Reference(s):
Acemoglu et al. (2005), Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth.
Acemoglu et al. (2001), An African Success Story: Botswana.
3— State capacity
Reference(s):
Besley and Persson, Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters.
4— The resource curse hypothesis
Reference(s):
Mehlum et al. (2000), Institutions and the Resource Curse.
Robinson et al. (2006), Political Foundations of the Resource Curse.
5— Oil and democracy
Reference(s):
Ross (2001), Does Oil Hinder Democracy?
Ross (2008), Does Oil Really Hinder Democracy?
Ross (2012), The Oil Curse.
6— Political regimes and economic performance
Reference(s):
Acemoglu (2009), Introduction to Modern Economic Growth.
7— Dictatorship
Reference(s):
Wintrobe (2002), Dictatorship.
Wintrobe (1998), the Political Economy of Dictatorship.
8— Dictatorship vs. democracy
Reference(s):
Acemoglu, and Robinson (2001), A Theory of Political Transitions.
9— political economy of sanction
Reference(s):
Hufbauer et al. (2007), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007), The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions.
10— Macroeconomics of resource dependence
Reference(s):
Barma et al. (2012), Rents to Riches; The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development.
Eifert et al. (2003), The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil-Producing Countries.
Arezki et al. (2011), Beyond the Curse: Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources.
Reference(s):
Besley (2007), The New Political Economy.
Blankart & Koester (2005), Political Economics versus Public Choice.
Alesina, Persson & Tabellini (2006), Reply to Blankart and Koester’s Political Economics versus Public Choice.
2— The role of institutions
Reference(s):
Acemoglu et al. (2005), Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth.
Acemoglu et al. (2001), An African Success Story: Botswana.
3— State capacity
Reference(s):
Besley and Persson, Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters.
4— The resource curse hypothesis
Reference(s):
Mehlum et al. (2000), Institutions and the Resource Curse.
Robinson et al. (2006), Political Foundations of the Resource Curse.
5— Oil and democracy
Reference(s):
Ross (2001), Does Oil Hinder Democracy?
Ross (2008), Does Oil Really Hinder Democracy?
Ross (2012), The Oil Curse.
6— Political regimes and economic performance
Reference(s):
Acemoglu (2009), Introduction to Modern Economic Growth.
7— Dictatorship
Reference(s):
Wintrobe (2002), Dictatorship.
Wintrobe (1998), the Political Economy of Dictatorship.
8— Dictatorship vs. democracy
Reference(s):
Acemoglu, and Robinson (2001), A Theory of Political Transitions.
9— political economy of sanction
Reference(s):
Hufbauer et al. (2007), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007), The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions.
10— Macroeconomics of resource dependence
Reference(s):
Barma et al. (2012), Rents to Riches; The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development.
Eifert et al. (2003), The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil-Producing Countries.
Arezki et al. (2011), Beyond the Curse: Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources.