Dynamic Value Shading
|Carnegie Mellon University|
This paper examines a class of dynamic decision problems with irreversible actions and its embedding in strategic settings. Agents face random opportunities for taking irreversible actions that, together with a private random shock, determine their final payoff. Information is given by a signal process that arrives throughout the decision period. Our main contribution is methodological; we provide a decomposition of the optimal – and equilibrium – solution into a dynamic component and a static one. The solution to the former problem is independent of the specific payoff function of the agent beyond some general regularity conditions. For games of incomplete information with privately observed actions, this decomposition reduces the problem of finding equilibrium strategies to a solution of a static Bayesian game. The setting applies to a class of strategic problems, such as some tournaments, entry games, intermediation, and dynamic commitments. Two detailed applications are considered.
ارائه کننده: دکتر مریم سعیدی
زمان: چهارشنبه ۲۳ تیر ۱۴۰۰ ساعت ۱۶:۳۰ تا ۱۸ عصر به وقت تهران
آدرس برگزاری سمینار: https://vclass.ecourse.sharif.edu/ch/econ-talks